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An evaluation of neurocognitive
models of theory of mind
Matthias Schurz* and Josef Perner
Centre for Cognitive Neuroscience, University of Salzburg, Salzburg, Austria
We review nine current neurocognitive theories of how theory of mind (ToM) is
implemented in the brain and evaluate them based on the results from a recent meta-
analysis by Schurz et al. (2014), where we identified six types of tasks that are the most
frequently used in imaging research on ToM. From theories about cognitive processes
being associated with certain brain areas, we deduce predictions about which areas
should be engaged by the different types of ToM tasks. We then compare these
predictions with the observed activations in the meta-analysis, and identify a number
of unexplained findings in current theories. These can be used to revise and improve
future neurocognitive accounts of ToM.
Keywords: theory of mind, mentalizing, neurocognitive theories, meta-analysis, task-categories, temporo-
parietal junction, medial prefrontal cortex
INTRODUCTION
For nearly two decades, Theory of Mind (ToM) has been studied in hundreds of functional
neuroimaging studies and competing theories about certain brain areas supporting speciﬁc
cognitive sub-processes of mentalizing exist. Understanding the cognitive processes that are
underlying typical ToM, and knowing in which situations they come into play, provides an
important interpretational basis for ﬁndings of atypical ToM in developmental and psychiatric
disorders.
Most neurocognitive theories converge on the following deﬁnition of ToM: the ability to make
inferences about one’s own and other people’s mental states. However, very diverse tasks are used
to operationalize ToM, and diﬀerent theories often rely on ﬁndings from diﬀerent studies, which
inﬂuences the scope of these accounts. Increasing evidence shows that the neural signature of ToM
diﬀers for diﬀerent tasks and stimuli (e.g., Gobbini et al., 2007; Bahnemann et al., 2010; Schurz
et al., 2014). Therefore, it was argued (Schaafsma et al., 2015) that ToM should not be treated as
monolithic ability in brain research, but needs to be deconstructed into more basic sub-processes
which allow a more speciﬁc mapping to brain areas. The key for such a deconstruction is to know –
or to have a good hypothesis about – which are the underlying sub-processes to look at.
One promising way to deﬁne the sub-processes of ToM would be a cognitive ontology, like
the cognitive atlas (Poldrack et al., 2011; visit http://www.cognitiveatlas.org). To date, cognitive
ontologies are in the build-up, but a deﬁnition of sub-processes involved in ToM is still missing.
In the present review, we rely on neurocognitive theories that make diﬀerent hypotheses about the
sub-processes of ToM.
We review nine neurocognitive theories on ToM, and summarize which sub-processes (i.e.,
forms of cognitive processing) are supposed to be engaged in ToM. We also review how these
sub-processes are thought to link to brain areas, and formulate predictions about whether these
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processes/areas should be engaged by the demands of diﬀerent
ToM tasks. Predictions from theory are then evaluated based on
the results from our meta-analysis (Schurz et al., 2014).
For practical reasons, we only address some of the most
popular representatives of an immensely large ﬁeld of published
neurocognitive theories and, in addition, we focus our review on
two major brain areas for ToM – the temporo-parietal junction
(TPJ) and the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC).
META-ANALYSIS FRACTIONATING ToM
Schurz et al. (2014) looked at the most common tasks in the
neuroimaging literature on ToM, and identiﬁed six large task
groups. We give representative examples for these tasks in
Table 1. When pooling brain activation over task groups, the
meta-analysis found the typical mentalizing network described
in the literature (Figure 1A). However, after performing separate
meta-analyses for each task group (Figure 1B), convergence
activation across tasks was found only in bilateral TPJ posterior
(TPJp) and dorsal mPFC. The task speciﬁc activation patterns
were then captured by ROI analyses, which are shown in
Figure 1C. The TPJ ROIs were placed into diﬀerent sub-areas
based on results from a connectivity-based parcellation (Mars
et al., 2011, 2012, 2013) of that area: More dorsal/posterior ROIs
in the Inferior Parietal Lobule (IPL) and posterior TPJ (TPJp),
and more anterior/ventral ROIs in the anterior TPJ (TPJa) and
the posterior Middle Temporal Gyrus (pMTG). Furthermore,
several ROIs were similarly placed in the mPFC according to a
connectivity-parcellation (Sallet et al., 2013): a ventral mPFCROI
(in so-called connectivity cluster #4), and a dorsal mPFC ROI
(connectivity cluster #3), as well as a posterior frontal cortex ROI
(in connectivity cluster #2). Locations of these ROIs are indicated
in Figure 1C.
COMPARING PREDICTIONS FROM
NEUROCOGNITIVE ACCOUNTS TO
RESULTS OF THE META-ANALYSIS
Results from our meta-analysis – with a focus on ROI results
shown in Figure 1C – will be related to diﬀerent neurocognitive
theories. On the one hand, we will review theories that assume
that areas have a ToM-speciﬁc function. On the other hand, we
will review theories that assume a domain-general function of
these areas, which are supporting ToM among other cognitive
abilities. The predictions of these proposals and their ﬁt to the
data from our meta-analysis are summarized in Table 2, and will
be discussed in the following sections in detail.
Domain Specific Theories
Theory of Mind Mechanism
Theory. Leslie and Thaiss (1992) argued for the existence of ToM
mechanism in the brain (ToMM), which is responsible for “kick-
starting belief and desire attribution” (Leslie et al., 2004, p. 528).
Predictions. Leslie and Thaiss’s (1992) theory makes no
prediction about the location of the ToMM, so we assume
it could be found both in the TPJ and in the mPFC. We predict
the ToMM to be involved in the tasks false belief, trait judgments,
strategic games, rational actions and social animations, because
they all implicate processing of beliefs and/or desires. We predict
ToMM not to be involved in the mind in the eyes task, as it does
not provide any information regarding beliefs or desires.
Evaluation. Both TPJ and mPFC show activation for all ﬁve tasks
where we predicted it (see Table 2 for summary). However, TPJ
and mPFC also show activation for the mind in the eyes task,
which is inconsistent with the ToMM hypothesis.
mPFC for Mental State Reflection
Theory. Amodio and Frith (2006) suggested that any kind of
reﬂection about mental states activates the anterior rostral
region of the Medial Frontal Cortex (arMFC), which roughly
corresponds to the location of our dorsal mPFC ROI.
Predictions. All six types of tasks should activate the dmPFC.
Evaluation. We indeed ﬁnd activation for all tasks in the dmPFC
ROI.
pSTS for Actions and mPFC for Decoupling
pSTS
Theory. Frith and Frith (1999) proposed a system for
representing other person’s actions in the posterior Superior
Temporal Sulcus (pSTS).
Predictions. Information about other’s actions is presented in the
tasks rational actions, strategic games and social animations (for
the latter, movements trigger the perception of actions), so we
expect pSTS involvement here. No clear prediction follows for
false belief and trait judgements, since false beliefs may trigger
anticipation of mistaken actions, and traits may involve habitual
action tendencies. No actions are presented in the mind in the
eyes task, so we expect no activation in the pSTS here.
Evaluation. To our knowledge, there is no clear anatomical
diﬀerentiation between TPJ and pSTS, but it is largely agreed that
TPJ is located more dorsal/posterior compared to pSTS. We will
therefore use dorsal/posterior ROIs in TPJp and IPL as proxy for
TPJ, and ventral/anterior ROIs in TPJa and pMTG as proxy for
pSTS. Conﬁrming the predictions, pSTS is activated for rational
actions and social animations. Contrary to our predictions, no
activation showed in pSTS when it was expected for strategic
games, but activation was present for mind in the eyes where it
was not predicted.
mPFC
Theory. Gallagher and Frith (2003) suggested that the
paracingulate cortex (roughly corresponding to our ROIs
dmPFC and vmPFC) hosts the decoupling mechanism proposed
by Leslie (1987), which enables keeping separate representations
from their ordinary input–output relations. This is necessary for
representing anything that is not straight registration of reality,
such as pretense, false beliefs, and, presumably, photographs.
Note that decoupling actually is a domain-general computational
mechanism, so it could be grouped to the theories presented in
the next section.
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TABLE 1 | Examples from each task-group in the meta-analysis by Schurz et al. (2014).
Author Imaging Experimental task Control Task
False belief vs. photo
Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003 fMRI n = 21 Read a short vignette involving a person holding a false
belief. Answer a question about her belief. e.g., John
told Emily that he had a Porsche. Actually, his car is a
Ford. Emily doesn’t know anything about cars so she
believed John. When Emily sees John’s car, she thinks
it is a . . .? (Porsche or Ford).
Read a false-photograph vignette. Answer a question
concerning the outdated content in the photo. e.g., A
photograph was taken of an apple hanging on a tree
branch. The film took half an hour to develop. In the
meantime, a strong wind blew the apple to the ground.
The developed photograph shows the apple on the . . .?
(tree or ground).
Trait judgments
Mitchell et al., 2002 fMRI n = 34 Read an adjective. Indicate whether it can be true for a
hypothetical person. e.g., “nervous” . . . can it be true
for “David?”?
Read an adjective. Indicate whether it can be true for an
object. e.g., “sundried” . . . can it be true for “grape”?
Strategic games
Kircher et al., 2009 fMRI n = 14 Play the prisoner’s dilemma game (iterated version). You
play with a human player for game points. Both players
choose a cooperative or defective strategy on each
trial. If both players choose defective, they gain almost
no game points at all. If both choose cooperative, both
gain some game points. If players choose differently,
the defective player gains more points.
Play the prisoner’s dilemma game (iterated version). You
play with a computer.
Social animations
Castelli et al., 2000 PET n = 6 Watch a video animation of two interacting triangles
(e.g., mother and child are playing). Explain verbally
what was happening (after fMRI).
Watch video animation of two randomly moving
triangles.
Explain verbally what was happening (after fMRI).
Mind in the eyes
Baron-Cohen et al., 1999 fMRI n = 12 View photographs of eyes. Indicate which of two words
(e.g., concerned vs. unconcerned) describes the
mental state of that person.
View photographs of eyes. Indicate if the person is male
or female.
Rational actions
Brunet et al., 2000 fMRI n = 8 View a cartoon story and predict what will happen
based on intentions of a character (no false belief).
Choose a logical story ending from several options
shown in pictures. e.g., A prisoner is in his cell. First, he
breaks the bars of his prison window. Then he walks to
his bed. Participants must indicate what will happen
next . . . the prisoner ties a rope from the sheets on his
bed/the prisoner shouts out loud.
View a cartoon story and predict what will happen
based on physical causality. Choose a logical story
ending from several options shown in pictures. e.g., A
person is standing in front of a slide. A large ball is
coming down this slide, heading toward the person
standing there. Participants must indicate what will
happen next . . . the ball is knocking over the person/the
ball is resting on the ground and the person is standing
next to it.
Predictions. Trait judgments and strategic games require
hypothetical considerations and thus a decoupling mechanism.
So do rational actions and false belief tasks, but here the
control conditions used in studies are of particular relevance:
for rational action tasks, control conditions require causal
reasoning about physical events, and for false belief, they ask
about the content shown on an outdated photograph. Thus,
both control conditions require hypothetical thinking just as the
corresponding experimental conditions of the tasks, so we do
not expect to ﬁnd (relatively increased) brain activation in the
mPFC. Finally, for processing social animations and mind in
the eyes tasks no possibilities have to be considered, and so no
decoupling and mPFC activation is expected.
Evaluation. In keeping with our predictions, trait judgments and
strategic games elicited activation the mPFC. Contrary to our
predictions, we also observed activation for the other four task
groups in the mPFC (at least at an uncorrected threshold in the
dmPFC ROI), where we expected to see none.
TPJ for Beliefs and mPFC for Socially Relevant
Information
TPJ
Theory. Saxe and Kanwisher (2003; see also Kanwisher,
2010) suggested that right TPJ (which the authors locate
dorsal/posterior to pSTS) is representing mental states with
propositional content like thoughts and beliefs, but not other
mental states without propositional content (like feelings or
bodily sensations).
Predictions. False belief and strategic games tasks require
reasoning about what another person thinks is going to happen,
so we expect them to activate the right TPJ. The case is less clear
for most other task groups. Saxe (2006) suggested that belief-
desire reasoning is also needed for thinking about true beliefs in
connection with intentional actions. If we accept this additional
assumption, we can predict that social animations and rational
actions also activate the right TPJ. Furthermore, traits can be
viewed as habitual patterns of behavior, thought, and emotion.
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FIGURE 1 | Summary of the results in Schurz et al. (2014). (A) Pooled meta-analysis on Theory of Mind (ToM) across all task-groups. Colors represent
probability values from statistical permutation testing (z-values). (B) Conjunction of six meta-analyses, statistically powerful permutation-based overlap analysis (for
details, see Schurz et al., 2014). Maps were thresholded at voxel-wise threshold of p < 0.005 uncorrected and a cluster extent threshold 10 voxels. (C) Regions of
interest in posterior temporo-parietal and medial prefrontal areas. Box-plots (median; 25 and 75th percentiles; 5 and 95th percentiles) show the distributions of
effect-sizes for the studies in each group. Effect-sizes were weighted by intra-study variances. Significant convergence of effect-sizes above zero was determined by
randomization tests; full circles indicate p < 0.005 uncorrected, z > 1. Empty circles indicate p < 0.05, z > 1.
From this perspective, we can also expect trait judgments to
activate the TPJ. Finally, we predict that the mind in the eyes
does not activate the TPJ, as it does not require thinking of
beliefs but rather judging about feelings (without propositional
content, e.g., judging that the person seems concerned, but
not making assumptions about what the person is concerned
about).
Evaluation. We found activation in the right TPJ, in particular in
the ROI TPJp, for all ﬁve tasks were we expected it. However, our
prediction of absence of activation for the mind in the eyes task
was not fulﬁlled, as this task also elicits activation in the right TPJ.
mPFC
Theory. Saxe and Powell (2006, see also Saxe and Wexler, 2005)
suggested that the mPFC has a less speciﬁc role in ToM, and
is engaged whenever we are processing socially or emotionally
relevant information about others.
Predictions. As all ToM tasks obviously present socially and
emotionally relevant information about others, we predict that
mPFC shall be engaged in all tasks.
Evaluation. Our meta-analysis fully supports this prediction, as
all tasks activate in mPFC, in particular in the dmPFC.
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TABLE 2 | Summary of evaluation of neuro-cognitive ToM accounts based on our results.
Expected activation and confirmation
Reference Theory Area referred to Hemi F T G R A E
Intradomain fractionation
Amodio and
Frith, 2006
Reflection on mental states arMFC
(ROI dmPFC)
− +

+

+

+

+

+

Leslie and
Thaiss, 1992
ToMM TPJ and mPFC
(Any ROIs therein)
n.a. +

+

+

+

+

−
×
Frith and Frith,
1999
Other person’s actions pSTS
(ROIs TPJa or pMTG)
n.a. 0 0 +
×
+

+

−
×
Decoupling mechanism Paracingulate area
(ROIs dmPFC or vmPFC)
− (−)
×
+

+

(−)
×
−
×
−
×
Saxe and
Kanwisher,
2003
Mental states w. prop.
content
TPJ
(ROIs TPJp or IPL)
R +

(+)

+

(+)

(+)

−
×
Socially relevant information mPFC
(ROIs dmPFC or vmPFC)
− +

+

+

+

+

+

Gobbini et al.,
2007
Covert mental states TPJ
(ROIs TPJp or IPL)
n.a. +

+

+

+

−
×
−
×
Overt mental states pSTS
(ROIs TPJa or pMTG)
n.a. −
×
−

−

−
×
+

+

Van Overwalle,
2009
Enduring mental states mPFC
(ROIs dmPFC or vmPFC)
n.a. (+)

+

+

(+)

0 0
Transient mental states TPJ
(ROIs pMTG, TPJa, TPJp or IPL)
n.a. +

−
×
+

+

+

+

Domain general fractionation
Perner and
Leekam, 2008
Perspectivity IPL
(ROI IPL)
n.a. +

(+)

0 −

−

−

Teleology pSTS
(ROIs TPJa or pMTG)
n.a. +

−

0 +

+

0
Decety and
Lamm, 2007
Comparing predictions to
external events
rTPJ
(ROIs pMTG, TPJa, TPJp, or IPL)
R (+)

0 +

−
×
+

−
×
Corbetta et al.,
2008
Attention reorienting rTPJ
(ROIs pMTG, TPJa, TPJp, or IPL)
R −
×
−
×
+

−
×
−
×
−
×
+... prediction of present activation, −... prediction of absent activation, 0... no prediction follows, ()... prediction only follows when making additional assumptions.
... results support prediction, ×... results do not support prediction.
F, False belief; T, Trait judgments; G, Strategic games; A, Social animations; E, Mind in the eyes; R, Rational actions.
TPJ for Covert and pSTS for Overt Mental States
TPJ
Theory. Gobbini et al. (2007) found that ToM tasks involving
false beliefs activate the TPJ more dorsally than social animations
and point-light-movement tasks. They hypothesized that this
reﬂects the diﬀerence between covert mental states that need to
be inferred from what one observes (e.g., beliefs) and more overt
mental states, like intention-in-action (Searle, 1980), where one
can perceive the mental states in the observed movements.
Predictions. From the theory that covert mental states activate in
TPJ/IPL, we predict that false belief, trait judgments, strategic
games and rational action tasks should activate the area. All
four tasks present covert mental states in the sense that what
needs to be represented is not immediately observable from an
action. Social animations and mind in the eyes tasks, on the other
hand, ask for inference about mental states which manifest in a
movement or facial expression, so we predict no activation here.
Evaluation. The predicted activation for the abovementioned
four tasks was found. However, predictions of absent activation
for social animations and mind in the eyes were not supported.
We found also here activation in TPJ, namely right TPJp (but not
IPL).
pSTS
Theory. Gobbini et al. (2007) hypothesized that overt mental
states activate more ventral areas in pSTS. We take ROIs in TPJa
and pMTG as a proxy for that location.
Predictions. Predictions are the opposite from those made above,
that is, pSTS should not be engaged by false belief, strategic
games, trait judgments and rational action tasks. However, the
area should be engaged by social animations andmind in the eyes,
as these present overt mental states.
Evaluation. The predicted occurrence of activation for social
animations and mind in the eyes tasks was supported by our
results. Also in keeping with our predictions, no activation was
found for trait judgments and strategic games. However, diﬀerent
from what we expected, also false belief and rational action tasks
showed activation in pSTS (in particular in right TPJa).
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TPJ for Transient and mPFC for Enduring Mental
States
TPJ
Theory. According to Van Overwalle’s (2009) model, the bilateral
TPJ (including pSTS, TPJ and IPL areas) is engaged in making
inferences about transient mental states such as immediate goals
and desires.
Predictions. In the tasks false belief, strategic games, rational
actions, social animations andmind in the eyes the goal is to infer
a transient mental state. For trait judgments, we predict absence
of activation, since no immediate goals or desires are involved.
Evaluation. We found activation in the TPJ (broadly deﬁned by
the model as pSTS, TPJ and IPL) for all ﬁve task groups where
this was predicted. However, activation was also found for trait
judgment tasks where we predicted no activation.
mPFC
Theory. Van Overwalle (2009) hypothesized that the mPFC
is engaged in making inferences about permanent social and
psychological properties of others, such as personality traits.
Predictions. Information about enduring mental states is cleary
processed in trait judgment tasks, and so mPFC activation is
expected. Following Van Overwalle’s (2009) reasoning, we also
predict activation for strategic games, because each player must
develop an impression of the trustworthiness, cooperativeness,
or competitiveness of the other. Another prediction following
Van Overwalle (2009) is that tasks presenting a rich social
context in their stimulus material could lead to spontaneous trait
inference, and thus engage the mPFC. Based on this assumption,
we furthermore expect activation in mPFC for false belief and
rational actions. With respect to social animations and mind in
the eyes tasks, Van Overwalle’s (2009) theory makes no clear
predictions.
Evaluation. In agreement with our prediction, we found
activation in mPFC for false belief, trait judgments, strategic
games, and rational actions. We also found activation for the two
task groups where we made no predictions.
Domain General Theories
pSTS for Teleology and IPL for Perspective
pSTS
Theory. Perner and Leekam (2008) and Perner and Roessler
(2010, 2012) proposed two cognitive mechanisms for ToM:
teleology and perspective taking (appreciation of perspective
diﬀerences). Teleology (coming from the greek word telos which
stands for purpose or goal) is linked to the pSTS and means
applying means-ends reasoning in order to predict others actions,
i.e., an agent will do what is needed in given circumstances.
No belief-desire reasoning requiring an appreciation of diﬀerent
perspectives is involved in this form of behavior explanation.
Predictions. The social animation and rational action tasks can be
interpreted within teleology. Also for false belief tasks, applying
the principle of rationality is required (however, it must be put
into perspective, see next section). No clear prediction can be
made for mind in the eyes and strategic games. In strategic games,
this is due to the nature of the control condition: players need to
consider what the other player is going to do, which may involve
means-ends reasoning. However, this may also take place during
the control condition playing against a computer algorithm,
where one also needs to ﬁgure out the computer’s strategy and
goals (see also Schurz and Tholen, 2015 for discussion). For trait
judgments, no immediate goals, circumstances or actions are
relevant, and so no teleology and activation in pSTS is predicted.
Evaluation. Results fully support our predictions: activation was
present for social animations, rational actions and false belief
tasks (for the latter only in right TPJa), and absent for trait
judgment tasks.
IPL
Theory. The second process to understand others is perspective
taking linked to IPL (dorsal TPJ). This allows belief-desire
reasoning by considering agents’ representations and subjective
perspectives of what is needed. The mental subjectivity of other
people’s reasoning can then be captured by teleology within
the other’s perspective (‘teleology-in-perspective’), i.e., in the
case of a false belief the other person will do what she would
need to do if the world were as she thinks it is. Processing
perspectivity is a process that cuts across the domain of ToM
to other areas of knowledge such as understanding false signs
(Aichhorn et al., 2009), identity (Arora et al., 2015), or level 2
visual perspective taking (Schurz et al., 2013; see also Schurz et al.,
2015).
Predictions. No perspective taking is needed for social
animations, mind in the eyes, or rational actions, and so no
activation of IPL is expected. False belief tasks require means-
ends reasoning (teleology) from another person’s perspective,
so we predict activation in IPL here. For similar reasons as
mentioned before in the section on pSTS, no clear prediction can
be made for strategic games. Trait judgments, on the other hand,
may require awareness of perspective. Traits are habitual patterns
of behavior, thought, and emotion. They are characteristic for
a person when the person’s habits deviate from the norm. For
instance, a person is called “anxious” or “nervous” (Mitchell
et al., 2002) if she tends to be concerned about situations where
one normally has no reason to be anxious. Therefore, many trait
judgments are judgments about whether a person habitually
takes a diﬀerent perspective on certain things in life, and so we
tentatively predict trait judgments to activate IPL.
Evaluation. Our predictions were fully supported. We only found
activation for false belief and trait judgment tasks in IPL, but not
for strategic games, social animations, rational actions, and mind
in the eyes tasks.
TPJ for Predictions about External Events
Theory. According to Decety and Lamm (2007, p. 583), ToM
tasks engage a domain-general “lower-level computational
mechanism involved in generating, testing, and correcting
internal predictions about external sensory events”, which is
mediated by the right TPJ.
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Predictions. For simplicity, we assume that only generating a
prediction about an external event already triggers activation
in the TPJ. We expect activation for strategic games and
social animations which obviously require generating predictions
about an upcoming event. For false belief tasks we can also
expect activation, if we additionally assume that participants
automatically think of the behavioral consequences of the
protagonist’s false belief. No activation in TPJ can be expected
for mind in the eyes, because they do not refer to external
events, and for rational actions because here studies asked
participants to predict an external event both in the experimental
(e.g., predict what the person will do next) and in the
control condition (e.g., predict what will happen due to
physical causality). For trait judgments, no clear expectation
follows.
Evaluation. Consistent with our predictions we found activation
for false belief, strategic games, and social animations.
Inconsistent with our predictions, however, we also found
activation for mind in the eyes and rational action tasks where
this was not expected.
TPJ for Attention Reorienting
Theory. According to Corbetta et al. (2008), the right TPJ is
responsible for the detection of salient and behaviorally relevant
stimuli in the environment that were previously unattended – a
cognitive process called exogenous or stimulus-driven attention.
Cabeza et al. (2012, p. 347) extended this idea by proposing the
TPJ/IPL to be responsible for guiding ‘bottom-up attention by
information entering working memory either from the senses or
from long-term memory.’
Predictions. We predict attention reorienting in strategic games
as players have to reorient attention away from their own goals
and movements to focus on what they get to know about the
other player. For false belief tasks we predict attention reorienting
to take place to the same amount in the experimental condition
(reorient away from own knowledge about reality to appreciate
the others belief) and the control condition (reorient away from
knowledge about reality to appreciate the outdated event shown
the photo). Therefore, no (relative increase in) activation is
predicted for false belief tasks. For social animations, rational
actions, and mind in the eyes, there is no obvious competition
between salient versus less salient information. Therefore we
do not see any reason for bottom-up attention orienting. Trait
judgment tasks often require judging whether a person habitually
takes a diﬀerent perspective on certain aspects of life than it
is the norm. However, comparing diﬀerent perspectives for a
trait judgment requires attention to be devoted to two pieces
of information simultaneously rather than reorienting from
one to the other, so we do not expect activation in the TPJ
here.
Evaluation. Consistent with our predictions, we found activation
in right TPJ for strategic games. However, inconsistent with
our predictions, we also found right TPJ activation for all ﬁve
other tasks, where the attention reorienting account would not
predict it.
CONCLUSION
In this reviewwe evaluated neurocognitive theories of ToM based
on results from a recent imaging meta-analysis (Schurz et al.,
2014). We checked whether predictions from those theories were
met by the results. We made four key observations.
The ﬁrst observation is that the large majority of failed
predictions are due to presence of activation for ToM tasks that
are not supposed to engage the cognitive processes in question.
This probably shows that authors had diﬀerent views on what
is a ToM task and what is not. The present review is based on
a “democratic” deﬁnition found in our meta-analysis (Schurz
et al., 2014), i.e., we included all studies that were labeled ToM
by the authors. Besides adopting such a “democratic” deﬁnition,
a further strategy for future theory building could be to include
tasks based on a reﬁned analysis of speciﬁc component processes
of mentalizing or teleology, rather than ﬁxating on the umbrella
term ToM (see also Schaafsma et al., 2015).
The second observation we made is that theories with best
predictive accuracy (e.g., Amodio and Frith, 2006; Saxe and
Powell, 2006) are often less speciﬁc about cognitive processing.
For example, Amodio and Frith (2006) postulate that dorsal
mPFC is engaged in all forms of mental state reﬂection – which is
largely equivalent to being engaged in all forms of ToM. Although
this claim is fully supported by our data, it does not provide a
cognitive explanation of how mental state reﬂection (i.e., ToM) is
implemented.
The third observation is that many theories use loose
deﬁnitions of the regions of interest they are focusing on. This
is the case both for mPFC and TPJ, and probably reﬂects
conclusions from some literature reviews (e.g., Gallagher and
Frith, 2003; Amodio and Frith, 2006; Frith and Frith, 2006;
Mitchell, 2009) that the ToM network is highly consistent in
localization across tasks, methods, and studies. More recently,
however, reviews found that brain activation within broad areas
such as TPJ or mPFC breaks apart for diﬀerent ToM tasks (e.g.,
Gobbini et al., 2007; Bahnemann et al., 2010; Schurz et al.,
2014). Thus, the predictive power of theories can be improved
by reference to more speciﬁc brain anatomy. We speculate that
this could also be helpful for ruling out some of the unexpected
ﬁndings of activation that were not foreseen in cognitive theories
(as described in our ﬁrst observation).
Our fourth observation relates to the role of control
conditions. The meta-analysis (Schurz et al., 2014) on which
we build this review grouped ToM tasks not only by stimuli
and instructions presented in the experimental condition, but
also by the kind of control condition employed. Reviewing the
ToM theories made clear that some accounts focus exclusively
on explaining the processes taking place in the experimental
condition (i.e., the ToM condition), without taking into account
which processes are controlled for by the control condition.
A prominent example for this is the attentional reorienting
account of TPJ function in ToM (e.g., Corbetta et al., 2008).
This account focuses on the false belief task to re-interpret
TPJ functioning during ToM. The argument is that in the false
belief task, participants ﬁrst form a representation of another
person’s belief and then get to know that the object of that
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belief has changed in reality. Therefore, when participants are
later asked about the belief of the person, they must reorient
their attention away from their own knowledge about reality and
toward the person’s false belief. An important issue for this theory
now comes with the control condition used in the analyzed false
belief studies. In the false photo control condition, participants
are asked what is shown on a photograph of a previous situation.
One can similarly argue that, in order to answer the question,
participants must reorient attention away from their knowledge
of the current state of aﬀairs and toward the past state that is
shown on the photograph. Therefore, when considering brain
activation diﬀerences for false belief > false photo, we do not
see attentional reorienting as a straightforward explanation, since
attentional reorienting seems to be needed in both conditions.
Taken together, these four observations show where existing
theories fail to predict results and discuss possible reasons. This
evaluation points out areas of improvement for future models.
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